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Aiming for the Sun- 
Averting the Fate of Icarus
INDUSTRY WATCH
Climate change is increasingly accepted as an 
existential threat to civilisation and ‘business as usual’ is 
considered a luxury we cannot afford any more. With 
burning fossil fuels accounting for almost half of the world’s 
greenhouse gas emissions,1 a world run on such energy 
sources is clearly not sustainable. At the same time, the 
cost of renewable energy (RE) has been dropping and it is 
becoming a viable alternative to fossil fuels. In fact, wind 
and solar energy prices have fallen as much as 73 percent 
in the last 10 years.2 In the U.S., the total cost of building 
and operating an RE facility over its lifetime is expected to beat 
one running on fossil fuels by even larger margins over the 
coming years.3 As per estimates, every U.S. dollar spent on 
RE today can generate US$3 in fuel savings by 2050.4 
It would hence come as no surprise that RE accounted for 
72 percent of all new capacity installations worldwide in 2019.5
While both wind and solar power generation capabilities 
have become cheaper, the biggest price drop belongs to 
the solar sector, with its generating utility-scale power 
becoming as affordable as power from fossil fuels. This is 
a substantial feat for the sector, given that solar power was 
7.6 times the cost of the cheapest fossil fuel-based power 
even as recently as in 2010. The savings for countries 
that adopt solar utility-scale projects is estimated to be huge, 
at about US$1 billion per year.6 
We must therefore acknowledge that RE has arrived at a 
beautiful confluence of economic viability and environmental 
considerations—and this would facilitate the shift to a green 
future that does not require regulatory directions or 
government subsidy. It has the potential to lead humankind 
towards a more sustainable path of growth. 
The fall in electricity costs from solar can be attributed to 
improved panel technologies, economies of scale, increasingly 
competitive supply chains, growing developer experience, and 
the rising comfort of financiers. This has been made possible by 
favourable policy and regulations framed by the governments, 
in addition to the vigour and initiative of the private sector. 
At the same time, project structuring has played a significant 
role and can further go a long way in reducing the price of 
clean technology. This article focuses on such successful 
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Renewable energy: The cost and the risks
RE prices are lower than conventional power only in 
certain countries. Even in those countries, it is realised 
only for projects that are well-structured. Governments and 
project developers all over the world bear a responsibility to 
deliver projects where the developer risk is sufficiently 
mitigated. Setting up such viable projects can have 
multi-fold advantages. First, they attract established developers 
to countries that otherwise would be perceived as too risky. 
Second, they encourage sovereign, pension, and trust funds 
to invest in RE projects, since these groups of investors 
are more interested in assured returns than windfall profits. 
And third, the low risk profile would allow debt structuring 
at lower rates. 
Some believe risk mitigation is a waste of time and effort 
since the RE sector is seeing an influx of large numbers 
of new players and prices are continuously decreasing. The 
bidding fields of RE projects in certain countries are increasingly 
witnessing the exuberance seen in casinos. Not surprising, 
they are also often observing accidents that usually accompany 
bouts of Russian roulette. Such failures deter serious long-term 
players from venturing into new countries and sectors. 
Furthermore, most RE projects have a component of 
public investment, which is laid waste with the failure of the 
project. If the high risk-taking developers are missing, consumers 
will get a conservative price as lenders (who provide 70 to 
75 percent of the capital) are extremely risk-averse and will 
compel the deal to assume the worst case, reflecting a higher 
solar tariff.
Therefore, solar projects must be viable for the sustainable 
growth of the solar sector. Viable RE projects, ring-fenced from 
the uncertainties of the host country, would encourage investors 
to move beyond the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) countries, boosting capital flow 
from pension, trust, and sovereign funds that are otherwise 
typically stuck in traditional sectors in developed countries 
at rather low rates of return. Capital becomes available 
internationally at low rates and for long periods, features 
that perfectly suit the RE sector with its typically long-term 
(20-25 years) Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). Instead 
of well-meaning organisations beseeching banks and financial 
institutions for green commitment, debt at reasonably low rates 
would itself veer towards projects that are sufficiently de-risked. 
Risk mitigation is even more important for the RE sector, 
since almost the entire investment in these projects has to be 
made prior to their commissioning, and the revenue expenditure 
is limited to operation and maintenance. Admittedly, risks 
can never be completely eliminated, especially for a period 
of 25 years, which invites uncertainty. However, it is the 
responsibility of the project proponent to anticipate and 
mitigate those risks and uncertainties. To a large extent, this 
could be made possible through careful project structuring 
and incorporating appropriate provisions in the PPA. A crucial 
issue is that unmitigated risks need not be left with the 
developer, and it is best to apportion a particular risk to 
the stakeholder that is best placed to address it. 
Through the examples of two RE projects, this article 
illustrates how sound project structuring can go a long way 
in bringing down the cost of solar energy. The first example 
is the 750 MW Rewa solar plant in India, which achieved a 
first-year tariff-rate of INR2.97/unit (US$0.04/unit), when 
the accepted norm of the Government of India was to pay 
Viability Gap Funding7 to achieve a tariff-rate of INR4.50/unit 
(US$0.06/unit). The other example is the rooftop solar 
project implemented in government buildings in the state of 
Madhya Pradesh, which achieved a rate of INR1.38/unit 
(US$0.019/unit) in its first year. Even if the subsidy were to 
be removed, its first-year tariff of INR1.38 would translate to 
INR2.28 (US$0.03), with three percent annual tariff 
escalation. This project brought rooftop solar prices on par 
with those for ground-mounted projects. 
Although the scale of these two projects differs, they 
illustrate that sincere attempts at robust project preparation, 
risk mitigation, and appropriate risk distribution among 
stakeholders could make solar energy far more affordable, 
thus facilitating the shift from fossil fuel-based energy to 
green and clean solutions. More widely, the projects highlight 
the structuring features that lead to successful public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). 
Risk reduction through robust  
project preparation
CLARITY ON LAND/SITE
One of the initial challenges typically faced by ground-mounted 
solar projects is the unavailability of land. The same 
problem manifests itself as unavailability of rooftop sites 
for solar rooftop projects. In many countries, large parcels 
of land belong to the sovereign, hence the sovereign 
is usually better-placed to arrange the large areas of land 
needed for RE projects. Therefore, the responsibility of 
arranging the site should be taken up by a public organisation. 
In the Rewa project, when the project was put to developers 
for bidding, 97 percent of land had already been procured by 
the project proponent, Rewa Ultra Mega Solar Limited 
(RUMSL), an entity jointly owned by Governments of 
India and the state of Madhya Pradesh. Similarly, for 
the rooftop solar project, only those projects where the 
rooftops had been made available were put up for bidding. 
ADDRESSING INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
REGARDING AVAILABILITY OF LAND/SITE
In both projects, data rooms were developed, where bidders 
could see the extent of land/sites that were made progressively 
available closer to their bidding dates. This was crucial for 
the rooftop project since developers in such projects usually 
have the added responsibility of marketing the Renewable 
Energy Service Company (RESCO) concept to consumers 
and negotiating the availability of the sites with them 
post-tender. 
The data room in the rooftop solar project had detailed 
information about the buildings, such as their Google Map 
coordinates, indicative Solar PV array layouts superimposed 
on Google images, and monthly electricity bill figures. 
For example, if a project group in the rooftop tender 
consisted of 291 college buildings, its data room would 
have 291 folders, each containing the abovementioned 
information for one building. It would have been impossible 
for bidders to visit the 291 college buildings located over 
a state that runs around 1,000 km from east to west and 
700 km from north to south. However, by accessing 
the data room, bidders could ‘see’ each of the 291 buildings 
and their pre-engineering solar project design with the 
click of a button. 
Risk reduction through  
contractual provisions 
PAYMENT SECURITY MECHANISM 
The single biggest risk or uncertainty for a developer is 
receiving the tariff payment, and on time. Almost all the 
investment is made upfront, and the developer expects to 
recover it through tariff payments over 25 years. Hence, 
payment security is a key concern for developers. This is 
especially crucial when the customer is a utility provider, since 
utilities, especially in developing countries, are often loss- 
making and have poor financial ratings. 
The Rewa solar project supplies 24 percent and 
76 percent of its output to the Delhi Metro and utilities 
of Madhya Pradesh respectively. While the financial rating of 
Delhi Metro was unimpeachable, two out of three utilities of 
Madhya Pradesh had the lowest ‘C’ rating,8 which indicated 
‘very low operational and financial performance capability’. 
The project addressed this risk by providing a unique 
three-tier Payment Security Mechanism (PSM). The first 
tier was a Letter of Credit from the utility, the second was a 
Payment Security Fund (PSF), and the third was a guarantee 
from the Madhya Pradesh state government against utility 
payments. Thus, the state government put up its own balance 
sheet to shore up the financial ratings of the utilities. With 
this innovative three-tier PSM, the project could successfully 
mitigate the enormous uncertainty regarding payment from 
the poorly-rated utilities. 
TERMINATION COMPENSATION
As the PPA duration is usually 25 years, clarity regarding 
consequences of early contract termination provides much- 
needed comfort to developers and their financiers. In both 
projects, a termination compensation clause was included. 
The compensation offered is higher in the event of the 
procurer defaulting, as compared to the developer defaulting. As 
the third tier of the PSM, the state government guarantee 
also covered termination compensation, apart from delayed 
payments. 
DEVELOPER COMMITMENTS COMMENCING WITH 
AVAILABILITY OF LAND/SITE
In a large number of projects, providing the land/site is 
the responsibility of the government or a public authority. 
Often, there is a delay in doing so, and the developer has to 
seek time extensions with its attendant challenges. The PPAs 
in both projects addressed this issue by stating that ‘day zero’ 
of the project would not start from the signing of PPA, but 
the day when the land/site was provided to the developer. 
Appropriate distribution of risk  
among stakeholders
CHANGES IN LAW
Changes in law and regulations is a risk that the developer is 
typically ill-equipped to handle. The developer is not in a 
position to influence either the Government or the regulators. 
It is also not in a position to anticipate the changes, especially 
over a long 25-year PPA period. It is hence necessary that the 
developer be insulated from this risk, which should be 
borne by the utility/consumer through clearly stated ‘change 
in law’ provisions. 
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TAXATION
Changes in law often pertain to taxation. It would make 
things less discretionary if the correlation between any 
change in taxation and impact on tariff is provided upfront 
in the PPA. In the rooftop project, it was stated in the 
Request for Proposal (RfP) and PPA documents that the 
relative change in taxation on the capital and operational 
cost would impact the discovered tariff to the extent of 
80 percent and 10 percent respectively. Even the benchmark 
costs for material components and yearly operation cost 
were provided in the documents. This meant that any change 
in taxation would lead to a corresponding change in the tariff 
that could be calculated through a formula given in the PPA, 
without having to file a petition before the regulator. 
For instance, it was widely expected that there would 
be an imposition of safeguard duty of 25 percent on solar 
cells soon after the close of bidding of the rooftop project, 
which proved to be so. It was clarified prior to the bidding 
that based on the provisions in the documents, 25 percent 
of safeguard duty on solar cells would increase the discovered 
tariff by 5.2 percent. This gave enormous comfort to the 
bidders, as it ensured that any subsequent change in taxation 
would be added transparently to the discovered tariff.
INSULATE RELATIONSHIP FROM THE GRID 
The relationship between the developer and the consumer, 
and the payments due to the developer from the consumer 
over the PPA period, should not depend on the decisions 
of the utility or the transmission company. For the rooftop 
solar projects situated within the premises of the consumer, the 
generator-consumer relationship has to be behind the metre. 
In other words, the generator needs to be paid based on 
the solar energy generated, irrespective of the regulations 
or the utility’s policy regarding excess energy, banking, etc. 
Thus, the PPA should provide for payment based on readings 
from the generation meter. The decision of the regulator or 
the utility regarding solar power generated that is not 
immediately consumed might change during the period 
of PPA and this risk has to be borne by the consumer. 
An interesting lesson from the Rewa solar project 
brought home the point that the risk should be 
borne by the stakeholder best placed to handle it. Delhi Metro, 
located 875 kilometres away from Rewa, was a consumer of 
Delhi utilities when discussions for the project started. The plan 
was to deliver power to Delhi through the national grid. Delhi 
Metro was keen on the delivery point being within the city. It 
seemed an innocuous request, given that the policy of the 
Government of India provided that inter-state transmission 
of RE would be free and the cost would be socialised. 
However, the relevant notification had not been issued 
until the bidding commenced. Hence, it would not have been 
appropriate to leave the risk of the inter-state transmission 
charges and losses from Rewa to Delhi with the developer, 
and Delhi Metro was persuaded that the delivery point would 
be Rewa and not Delhi. 
After the PPAs had been signed and the project activities 
were about to begin, the Government of India issued the 
awaited notification, providing for free inter-state transmission 
of renewable energy, but applicable only to utilities. As 
Delhi Metro was not a utility, it could not take advantage of 
the free inter-state transmission. Given that the charges for 
transmission from Rewa to Delhi would have been almost 
40 percent of the cost of power, had the delivery point been 
kept at Delhi as Delhi Metro had requested, the additional 
cost would have fallen on the developers who would have been 
unable to bear the additional charge and would have defaulted. 
Nevertheless, since the delivery point had been decided 
as Rewa and the risk of charges for inter-state transmission 
from Rewa to Delhi was left with Delhi Metro, they took 
it upon themselves to request the Government of India for 
a change in policy. While the decision is still pending, 
transmission charges have not been imposed on Delhi Metro 
over the last two years that the project has been running. Even 
if such charges were to be imposed, they would be levied 
on Delhi Metro and the cost of delivering power from 
Rewa would still be lower than the rate of Delhi utilities. 
More importantly, the project has insulated itself from the 
risk of changing government policy. 
Avoiding the fate of Icarus 
Solar energy has shifted from the ‘vicious cycle’ of high 
cost that limits its application and consequent attention to 
a ‘virtuous cycle’. In this context, the two examples of Rewa 
and Madhya Pradesh’s solar rooftop projects demonstrate 
that risk mitigation through robust project preparation, careful 
project structuring, and appropriate distribution of risk among 
stakeholders can lead to successful solar projects. 
Apart from the path-breaking low rates achieved, both the 
projects attracted enthusiastic participation from the developers. 
RUMSL, the proponent of Rewa solar project, was a new 
kid on the block. Established in July 2015, it has ventured 
into territories reserved for established federal companies. 
Despite this, as many as 20 reputable solar developers, 
including six international companies, participated in the 
bidding for the Rewa project. The tender was oversubscribed 
by 10 times. Similarly, Madhya Pradesh’s RESCO tender 
attracted 40 international and domestic bidders, and was 
oversubscribed by 630 percent.
Following the Rewa project bid in February 2017, the 
Government of India issued Standard Bidding Guidelines 
for ground-mounted solar projects in August 2017.9 These 
guidelines incorporated many notable features of the 
Rewa project, ensuring that the principles of risk reduction 
become standard practice for all ground-mounted solar 
projects in India, leading to a continued decrease in solar 
prices (which have, as of April 2021, reached INR 2/unit, 
or about US$0.026/unit). The Rewa project also received 
the World Bank Group President’s Award for innovation and 
excellence for its transaction structure.
The Madhya Pradesh rooftop solar project, with an 
investment of US$26 million, led to government savings of 
US$323 million over its project life in net present value 
(NPV) terms. Its RESCO documents have been circulated 
by the Government of India to all states. The project is also 
being replicated by the World Bank in some Indian states 
and by the International Solar Alliance (ISA) in ISA 
member countries. 
Solar energy is now the cheapest source of energy in 
many countries, without the crutches of regulatory directions 
or subsidies. This revolution has to be carried all around the 
world, to achieve the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) of energy access, economic development, and concern 
for the climate. There is a broad global coalition in favour 
of RE, and the establishment of organisations like the Indian 
Solar Alliance shows global commitment towards this cause. 
The time is ripe to think hard and act quickly to make a dent 
on the wall of fumes that humans have created. 
We need continuous innovation to deliver solar power at 
lower costs. Solar project innovation is important and powerful 
because it can provide solutions that are more persistent than 
democratically-achieved compromises. At this moment in 
history, the calling is to set up viable projects where risks 
are mitigated and long-term returns assured. The risk 
mitigation needs robust project preparation and careful 
project structuring. Risks that cannot be mitigated need to 
be left not necessarily with developers, but rather with the 
stakeholder best placed to handle them. If we take such steps, 
we can fly high, without the solar sector meeting the fate 
of Icarus whose wings tragically melted when he came too 
close to the sun. 
Solar energy has shifted from the 
‘vicious cycle’ of high cost that limits 
its application and consequent 
attention to a ‘virtuous cycle’.
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